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1. The Problem: How Can Complex Organizations that Have Members with Lim-
ited Rationality Learn?
Imagine a store-clerk in a manufacturing organization. His or her task entails watching
the materials and parts on stock. As soon as the stock of a material or part reaches its re-
order point, he or she has to trigger an order for restocking by filling in a form and
sending it to the purchasing department.
Such a simple organizational rule provides a couple of problem solutions: It ensures that
the probability of interruptions in the production process remains low, and, at the same
time, that inventories are kept on a low level in order not to bind too much capital. The
stock-clerk does not need to know about the pending orders or the stocks of finished
products, he or she can "produce" acceptable solutions just by applying the rule. Of
course, the solutions that are provided by the clerk are appropriate only to the extent to
which the re-order points have been set in a way that takes care of these problem dimen-
sions. Leaving aside for a moment the question on how these re-order points are deter-
mined, we can state that the rule serves as a storage of organizational knowledge. The
store-clerk does not have to calculate solutions by taking into consideration develop-
ments of demand, delivery times of suppliers, finished products on stock etc., he or she
does not even have to understand the formula behind the rule, but only has to apply the
rule reliably. Rules also retain organizational knowledge beyond the tenure of individuals.
Changes of such rules are brought about, to some extent, by applying rules for change.
For example, the organizational member who is responsible for determining the re-order
points may have developed a formula which tells him or her how to adapt the re-order
point if demand increases by a certain rate or the flexibility of production is increased.
In a similar way, the changing of change rules is also, to some extent, accomplished by
applying rules: the organizational member in charge has, for example, set up rules and is
sharing them with others in the department on which consultant to turn to if problems
connected with inventories come up or which general methods to apply (e.g. reengi-
neering). These search rules facilitate OL. Thus it is possible to distinguish rule based OL
processes of higher order: rules to support the changing of change rules and rules that2
support the changing of rules that support the changing of change rules etc. However,
rules do not only facilitate OL, they can also impede it. This aspect of rules is usually
subsumed under the concept of bureaucratization. Organizational rules have functional
and dysfunctional aspects, something that will be discussed in more detail later. In gen-
eral, no organization of any complexity can exist without rules. That means that OL is
always influenced - positively and negatively - by organizational rules.
In spite of a broad agreement among researchers in organizational theory on the impor-
tance of rules for the functioning of organizations, most theories of OL neglect or tend to
underestimate the role of organizational rules in processes of OL. However, there is one
important exception: James G. March, his cooperators and his students. He and Richard
Cyert (1963) developed a theory of OL long before this concept became a management
fashion. And since then he and his group have continuously revised and developed this
theory. These theories provide fundamental insights into processes of OL, although, so
far, they have not yet received adequate recognition in the more popular management
literature. These theories assume that complex organizations learn by the ways in which
individuals experiment, form inferences and code the lessons of history into rules. OL is
based on routines. It is history-dependent and target-oriented. To a large extent OL de-
pends on the relation between observed organizational outcomes and the aspirations set
for these outcomes (Levitt and March, 1988: 320).
In this article we try to give an introduction into the theories on learning in the March
school and link it with our own conceptual and empirical work. At first we will analyze
the role of rules for organizations and organizational members, i.e. their foundings and
changes, their functions and dysfunctions. In the following section we try to reconstruct
the development of theories of organizational learning within the school of March. Fi-
nally, we apply these theories to specific processes of OL.3
2. Formal Rules as Basic Elements of Organizations
2.1. The Genesis of Formal Rules
In the Middle Ages, the idea that rules can be rationally constructed with regard to cer-
tain purposes was completely unknown (Weber, 1978). The dominant institutions at this
time were social formations like the guild, the clergy or the nobility, which totally en-
compassed its members (Kieser, 1989). The rules of these institutions were based on
tradition and religion. It was impossible to change these rules only to increase the effec-
tiveness or efficiency of the institution. For instance, guild members who changed the
rules of production in their shops were imprisoned. In modern organizations, formal rules
specify tasks and decision competences more or less precisely for organizational mem-
bers, hierarchical relationships, and work procedures. Organizational members who are
entitled to introduce or to change formal rules can do so whenever they think that this is
appropriate.
"Originally there was a complete absence of the notion that rules of conduct pos-
sessing the character of 'law', i.e., rules which are guaranteed by 'legal coercion',
could be intentionally  created as 'norms'. ... But where there had emerged the con-
ception that norms were 'valid' for behavior and binding in the resolution of dis-
puts, they were at first not conceived as the products, or even the possible subject
matter, of human enactement. Their 'legitimacy' rather rested upon the absolute sa-
credness of certain usages as such, deviation from which would produce either evil
magical effects, the restlessness of spirits, or the wrath of the gods. As 'tradition'
they were, in theory at least, immutable. They had to be correctly known and inter-
preted in accordance with established usage, but they could not be created. Their
interpretation was the task of those who had known them longest, i.e., the physi-
cally oldest persons or the elders of the kinship group, quite frequently the magi-
cians and priests, who, as a result of their specialized knowledge of the magical
forces, knew the techniques of intercourse with the supernatural powers." (Weber,
1978: 760)
Formal rules enable individuals to be members of several organizations at the same time.
In each organization in which a person is a member, he or she only invests limited re-
sources, e.g. the willingness to work a certain number of hours per week, to pay mem-
bership fees, to invest capital, or to entitle other organizational members to act on his or
her behalf (Kieser, 1989). Without formal rules which define organizational roles, it
would be impossible for individuals to manage such a multitude of organizational mem-
berships. Rules that define organizational roles also bring about a decoupling of organ-4
izational goals from personal goals of the members. In order to become a member of an
organization, it is not necessary to identify oneself with the goals of this organization. It
is sufficient when the members accept the membership conditions and regard the in-
ducements that are offered by the organization - pay, chances for advancement etc. - as a
fair compensation for their contributions to the organization  (Barnard, 1968; Luhmann,
1972).
Within the limits of their formally defined roles, members cannot refuse to respond to
organizational expectations without risking their membership. Consequently, the organi-
zation can confront its members with highly "artificial roles", i.e. roles which the mem-
bers do not have to identify with. In principle, this means that, compared to other institu-
tions, organizations can realize a high degree of flexibility. Formal rules also allow an
internal differentiation of the organization into specialized departments. A person who
works in a specialized department only needs to have cursory knowledge of the tasks
that are performed in other departments. The clerk in the bookkeeping department
knows very little of work processes in sales or production. Nevertheless, the work per-
formed in different departments is coordinated with regard to the organizational goals.
The activities in one department are harmonized to a sufficient degree with activities in
other departments. This is accomplished by formal rules that keep the activities of the
different departments within certain bounds. A "superrational" organizational designer of
rules who is an expert in all the functions of the organizations is not required to construct
rules which bring about this coordination. As we will see later in more detail, formal
rules develop in an evolutionary way: rules that do not fit together are gradually replaced
in an trial and error process by better fitting ones.
2.2. Functions and Dysfunctions of Organizational Rules
Organizational rules reduce complexity and uncertainty for individuals with limited
rationality: Rationality of individuals is limited (Simon, 1958; March and Simon, 1958;
March, 1994): When making decisions, individuals cannot know all the alternatives
available for this decision, they are not able to anticipate the consequences of alterna-5
tives, and they cannot anticipate the utilities they would attach to possible consequences.
In everyday life, individuals deal with their limited rationality by satisfycing instead of
maximizing, by basing their decisions on drastically simplified models of the real world
and by relying heavily on routine behaviour.
But how can individuals who are equipped with only limited cognitive capabilities cope
with highly complex decisions as they are required in modern organizations? According
to Simon (1979: 501), "... organizations ... can only be understood as machinery for
coping with the limits of man's abilities to comprehend and compute in the face of com-
plexity and uncertainty." A central function of formal rules is to reduce complexity and
uncertainty for individual decision makers. The basic mechanisms by which this is
achieved are: departmentalization, standardized operating procedures (programmes),
hierarchy, standardized information and indoctrination or, as we would say nowadays,
organizational culture. By setting premises these mechanisms facilitate decision-making
for individuals:
"Individual choice takes place in an environment of 'givens' - premises that are ac-
cepted by the subject as basis for his choice; and behaviour is adaptive only within
the limits set by these 'givens.' ... One function that organization performs is to
place the organizational members in a psychological environment that will adapt
their decisions to the organization objectives, and will provide them with the in-
formation needed to make these decisions correctly." (Simon, 1979: 79)
The premises consist of the following organizational devices, all of which are based on
organizational rules:
(1) Departmentalization: Departmentalization requires, as we have seen, the implemen-
tation of organizational rules. It reduces the number of criteria a decision maker within a
department has to take into consideration. For example, the personnel manager only has
to consider criteria relevant to personnel and can abstract from problems of accounting,
production or marketing. In this sense, organizations are "loosely coupled systems"
(Weick, 1976; Orton and Weick, 1990).
(2) Standard operation procedures: If standard operating procedures are available to
solve a certain problem, there is no need for the individual to develop problem solutions
creatively each time this problem comes up. The programme or standard operating pro-
cedure provides the solution. As long as this solution is appropriate, it is possible to give6
difficult tasks to persons who are not able to develop adequate solutions on their own.
Thus, standard operating procedures reduce the need to collect information; the
"condensed" experience of the organization with regard to the respective problem is
stored in programmes. In higher-order programmes knowledge on how to create and
revise lower-order programmes is stored (March and Simon, 1958: 149, 190).
(3) Indoctrination or organizational culture: The organizational culture encompasses
organization-specific priorities and norms that the members have internalized (Smircich,
1983; Schein, 1985). To a certain extent, internalized norms can substitute written stan-
dard operating procedures. The advantage of norms embedded in the organizational
culture is that they allow a higher degree of flexibility than written rules. It is also as-
sumed that a higher degree of identification and motivation is brought about by cultural
norms.
(4) Communication: Organizational members do not have to find out what kind of infor-
mation is important for the decisions they have to make. Through its information system
the organization provides the members preselected information. Decision makers do not
have to define and characterize their environment themselves, the organization defines it
for them and thus narrows their focus of attention.
(5) Hierarchy: Some premises are set by members on higher levels of the organization.
The organizational members normally cannot and need not question the decisions made
on higher levels. This also reduces complexity and uncertainty.
Formal rules increase efficiency: Weber (Weber, 1978) has already pointed out that,
compared to other forms of administration those bureaucracies or organizations, which
are based on formal rules, achieve a high degree of efficiency. They are efficient, ac-
cording to Weber, because their rules can be constructed in such a way as to interlock
smoothly like the cogwheels of a machine. Rules also make organizational reactions
highly predictable which allows an increase of efficiency in interactions between organi-
zations (Weber, 1988a: 322).
Formal rules also make it easier for new organizational members to integrate themselves
into the work processes; or, seen from the perspective of the organization, by applying
formal rules, organizations make themselves independent of specific individuals. Of7
course, by enabling individuals with limited rationality to perform complex tasks in a
coordinated fashion, organizational rules also contribute to the efficiency of the organi-
zation.
The arguments which we have brought forward so far in order to explain efficiency in-
creasing effects of formal rules rest on the assumption of a stable environment. In dy-
namic environments, formal rules tend to reduce the adaptability of organizations and
this decreases effectiveness and efficiency. In the section on dysfunctional effects of or-
ganizational rules, we will analyse these consequences in more detail. The appropriate
organizational response to this problem is not necessarily a reduction of the number of
organizational rules but rather a preference for less detailed rules and a concentration on
effective higher-order rules, whose task is to change lower-order rules.
Formal rules exercise and limit power: Formal rules prescribe how things have to be
done. Organizational members who violate rules have to face sanctions. Therefore, rules
exercise power over those who have to follow them. In this respect, the effect of a rule
on an organizational member is similar to that of an order from a higher ranking member
(Gouldner, 1955). Certain formal rules also legitimize the exercise of power for the
holder of offices (Clegg, 1975).
At the same time, formal rules depersonalize power differences between organizational
members. It is the office, the decision competences and the formally defined possibilities
for the application of sanctions which provide power to the office holder, not his per-
sonal characteristics, his "natural authority".
On the other hand, the formality of rules allows subordinates to follow the rules without
having to identifiy with them. They can even signal to others that they do not agree with
the rules that they have to follow. Rules also protect subordinates against arbitrariness of
superiors: Subordinates can, in principle at least, resist demands from superiors which
are obviously not in accordance with the rules. In other words: The superior, when issu-
ing orders, also has to observe the limitations which are set by the rules (Weber, 1961).
Formal rules, according to Gouldner (1955) define minimum requirements and, thereby,
tend to reduce motivation of organizational members. This tendency necessitates closer
supervision of subordinates. Thus, on one hand, formal rules reduce tensions between8
superior and subordinate by partially depersonalizing their relationship. On the other
hand, by defining minimum standards, formal rules induce closer supervision, which in-
creases these tensions.
Organizational rules serve as organizational memories: Organizations store knowledge
in standard operating procedures (March, 1991). Organizational rules, like rules of other
kinds, are in need of interpretation (Mills and Murgatroyd, 1991). Most organizational
rules are useless if not combined with specific knowledge of organizational members
who apply these rules. This knowledge often takes the form of scripts (Abelson, 1981;
Lord and Foti, 1986; Gioia and Poole, 1984; Gioia and Manz, 1985; Ashford and Fried,
1988).
A script is a cognitive structure that specifies a typical sequence of occurrences in a
given situation, such as a formal meeting or an employment interview. Thus, scripts ex-
tend formal rules: they contain information which is stored in the minds of the organiza-
tional members on how to behave when certain rules apply. They also contain interpreta-
tions of rules with respect to adequate behaviour.
Thus, the notion of organizational rules as storages of organizational knowledge denotes
the use of rules by trained individuals, i.e. rules and cognitive scripts in their intercon-
nectedness. In organizational units which are characterized by a high density of rules, a
higher proportion of script-based behaviour is to be expected (Ashford and Fried 1988).
The concept of organizational routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982) or organizational
competences ("comps") (McKelvey and Aldrich, 1983) captures both, organizational
rules and individual knowledge that is attached to these rules, i.e. scripts:
"(T)he knowledge stored in human memories is meaningful and effective only in
some context, and for knowledge exercised in an organizational role that context is
an organizational context. It typically includes, first, a variety of forms of external
memory - files, message boards, manuals, computer memories, magnetic tapes -
that complement and support individual memories but that are maintained in large
part as a routine organizational function." (Nelson and Winter 1982: 105)
The concept of organizational routines also encompasses "tacit" knowledge, i.e. the ap-
plication of rules which are not consciously known by the person who exercises certain
skills (Polanyi, 1962). (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 124/5) "[r]outines are the skills of an9
organization. The performance of an organizational routine involves the effective inte-
gration of a number of component subroutines (themselves further reduceable) and is
ordinarily accomplished without 'conscious awareness' - that is, without requiring the
attention of top management. This sort of decentralization in organizational functioning
parallels the skilled individual's ability to perform without attending to the details."
In a similar manner, Malik and Probst (1984: 110-1) find that the formulation of organ-
izational rules always includes tacit knowledge. They warn organizational designers who
are trying to implement a radical change of the organization not to destroy the rules
which contain experience of individuals and groups and which came about by trial and
error - i.e. rules which represent tacit knowledge or are the result of "spontaneous order"
(Hayek, 1967: 24).
Organizational rules erect facades of rationality: The institutional school (Zucker,
1986; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1987; Scott, 1992; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983;
DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) argues that organizations often adopt rules that are
"institutionalized", i.e. rules that in the eyes of important stakeholders represent "good
practice". Generally, institutionalized norms define how a "rational organization" should
look like, e.g. which departments it should have, how it should calculate profitability of
investment projects, which methods it should implement in order to determine the sala-
ries of its employees, etc. By adopting institutionalized rules organizations demonstrate
and acquire legitimacy. Legitimacy, in turn, stabilizes internal and external relationships
and increases the likelihood that the organizations will secure the resources it needs for
survival (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).
If an organization has to adopt organizational rules which it does not consider useful in
order to achieve legitimacy, it applies decoupling mechanisms in order to separate the
facade from the technical core: It pays lip service, it tries to avoid control by the envi-
ronment by applying weak formulations of organizational goals, by ritualizing control
from the outside as well as statements of account, etc.
In an empirical analysis, Zhou (1991; 1993) found that the rate of changes in the rules
that were issued by the senate of an American university decreased during the history of
this university. At the same time, the senate issued new rules. In his interpretation of10
these findings Zhou refers to the institutional school. Outside pressures force a university
to adopt certain rules. The stability of these rules increases over time, either because they
are perceived as self-evident (Zucker, 1983) or because they assume a symbolic charac-
ter and become decoupled from core activities of the organization (Meyer and Rowan,
1977).
Having analyzed the functions of organizational rules we now turn to their dysfunctions:
Dysfunctions of Organizational Rules: Organizations, according to Weber, become „iron
cages“ over time : The machinery of the organization becomes inescapable. It develops
its own dynamics which members or external stakeholders can only control to a limited
extent (Ritzer, 1993). The organizational members are therefore not able to change rules
of the organization if these rules contradict their personal ideas of an appropriate treat-
ment of problems (Weber, 1961; Weber, 1988b).
Formal rules that were originally designed as means for certain ends become ends in
themselves (Merton, 1940). When organizational members perceive that programmes no
longer solve problems adequately, they realize that they will probably come under attack.
Since their possibilities to change the rules are limited, they prefer to leave the pro-
grammes unchanged, and they decide to follow the programmes to the letter, in order to
immunize themselves against criticism which is very likely to emerge because of the low
quality of problem solution (Crozier, 1964). The conflicts that are triggered by inade-
quate problem solutions within the organization very often do not result in efforts to im-
prove the programmes but rather in power struggles between groups and departments
and these conflicts distract efforts from the original problems (Crozier, 1964: 187-194).
The existence of programmes reduces the motivation to develop creative solutions. Or-
ganizational members develop a tendency to solve problems by applying standard oper-
ating procedures mechanically. Since they are not used to take responsibility and risks
they tend to ask higher levels to install more detailed rules, when they discover that they
have freedom of choice in some details. Organizational members with these characteris-
tics tend to confound precision in applying rules with quality of problem solution. In the
words of Sims et al. (1993: 31): "Rules can become the opium of bureaucratic officials.
Without the rules, they are lost, paralysed." In this way, rules can impede OL.11
In a similar vein, Nelson and Winter (1982: 110) speak of organizational routines as
truce:
"Conflict, both manifest and latent, persists, but manifest conflict follows largely
predictable paths and stays within predictable bounds that are consistent with the
ongoing routine. In short, routine operation involves a comprehensive truce in in-
traorganizational conflict. There is a truce between the supervisor and those super-
vised at every level in the organizational hierarchy: the usual amount of work gets
done, reprimands and compliments are delivered with the usual frequency, and no
demands are presented for major modifications in the terms of the relationship."
In systems which combine high complexity and tight coupling of subsystems with high
risk, it is not possible for members to anticipate all failures. Tight coupling requires cen-
tralization, i.e. unquestioned obedience and immediate response according to rules. Since
unplanned interactions of failures are very likely to occur, complexity requires careful
search that is not controlled by rules, but by a careful analysis of the system by those who
are closest to the problem at question. Since these requirements are incompatible, Per-
row (1984) advocates giving up high risk technologies that combine complexity and tight
coupling of subsystems.
3. Creation and Modification of Rules in Organizations
Recognition that rule-following characterizes much of the behaviour in organizations has
directed attention to the processes by which rules emerge, change, and develop over time
(March, 1981). In general, in the literature of the behavioural theory, rules are seen as
reflecting history. Three major processes by which rules develop are commonly consid-
ered (Cyert and March, 1963: 231):
First, the rational paradigm suggests that rules are created in an intentional, calculated
process by rational actors. The actors design rules after having analyzed the current
situation. The differences among organizations in the rules they follow and use can be
attributed to differences in their environments. Specific decision rules are assumed to
dominate, because they provide advantages (Cyert and March, 1963). The behavioural
theory emphasizes how slow and indeterminate the match between environment and or-
ganizational rules often is, i.e., it emphasizes the inefficiencies of history.12
A second process of rule development is learning from experience. In this approach, or-
ganizational rules emerge and are further modified incrementally on the basis of feedback
from the environment either through the organization’s own experience or through imi-
tation. This view is in accordance with the concept of organizational rules and routines
as storages of organizational knowledge (partly tacit). OL is achieved by scrutinizing the
existing rules with the aim of identifying opportunities for improvement (Nelson and
Winter, 1982). The firms identify and select new rules by focusing on idiosyncrasies of
processes founded on unique aspects of a firm's history. Thus the elicitation and repre-
sentation of knowledge embedded in organizational rules and routines is crucial in the
process of learning.
The third process which can lead to changes in organizational rules is the process of se-
lection among invariant rules. As in the case of experiental learning the rules are depend-
ent on history, but the mechanism is different. Individual rules are seen as invariant, but it
is claimed that the population of rules changes over time (McKelvey and Aldrich, 1983).
These approaches which describe the way in which less effective routines are replaced by
more effective ones can be classified as early attempts to explain rule-based OL.
By conceptualizing organizational routines as equivalents to genes in biological evolu-
tion, Nelson and Winter (1982: 135) also underline the function of routines as organiza-
tional memories. They integrate this function into an evolutionary concept. They assume
that the future behaviour of organizations, being based on routines, resembles behaviour
that would be produced if they would simply follow their routines of the past. In other
words: the evolution of organizations does not occur in jumps. Capacity expansion nor-
mally takes the form of "faultless replication" of routines. According to Nelson and
Winter, imitation of effective routines within the organization can be seen as a powerful
mechanism which accomplishes that effective routines spread faster in a given organiza-
tion than less effective ones. New routines come about when scientists, engineers or
managers apply problem solving creativity. In the end, whether attempts of this kind
prove successful, is decided by environmental selection.
In their version of population ecology theory, McKelvey and Aldrich (1983) also take
organizational routines - they call them "comps" which is derived from competences - as13
the basic units of organizational evolution. Variations in comps occur, when organization
designers err when trying to copy comps from other organizations or when trying to ra-
tionally improve comps. Since organization designers are not able to rationally adapt
comps to changing conditions of the environment, the variations that they produce in
their efforts for improvement are essentially "blind". It is not the designer who makes the
important choices, it is the environment via "natural selection".
Natural selection as conceptualized in McKelvey and Aldrich's version of the population
ecology approach results in higher chances of more effective comps getting reproduced
in an organizational population. This notion is similar to the basic mechanism in biologi-
cal evolution: Antilopes, which have gained the ability to run faster through mutation,
live longer, and, therefore have more chances to reproduce themselves, so that the ability
to run fast - or, to be more precise the genes that provide this ability - spreads in the
population. For organizations, the selection process operates in the following way: Suc-
cessful organizations must necessarily have a higher percentage of successful comps than
less successful organizations. Successful organizations’ comps also have a higher chance
of getting copied by other organizations: Other organizations prefer to hire employees
who bring in experience from successful organizations; the solutions of successful or-
ganizations are communicated more often in business magazines, management best-
sellers, university textbooks and management seminars. Consultants tend to transfer
problems solutions - comps - from successful organizations to less successful ones. In
this way, effective comps acquire a higher chance to spread in the population than less
effective ones.
Hayek (1973) also developed an evolutionary concept of rule- or routine-based  OL. His
basic thesis is that a "spontaneous order" is preferable over a "planned order". Spontane-
ous order implies tacit knowledge. In order to explain the emergence of rules as the re-
sult of evolutionary processes, Hayek assumes an interaction of two processes (Vanberg,
1986): (1) a process of variation in which new transmittable patterns of behavior are
continuously generated, and (2) a process of selection whereby from all variance
(patterns of behavior) generated, those patterns are systematically selected that are actu-
ally transmitted, i.e. that become behavioural regularities (routines) in social systems.
Hayek stresses the role of those individuals who, by deviating from traditional rules and14
by experimenting with new practices, act as innovators and generate "new variance"
which may become new behavioral regularities in a social community if these practices
prevail in the sense of being imitated by more and more individuals in the group, despite
competition with traditional as well as alternative new ways of behavior (1979: 167).
Such an argument obviously contains the idea of a process of variations by individual
innovations and a process of selection by individual imitation. Thus Hayek's concept is in
essence an individualistic, invisible-hand conception of cultural evolution.
Vanberg (1986: 82) criticizes Hayek's basic assumptions of an evolution of routines:
"When Hayek ... refers to cultural evolution as a process by which adaptations to
changing circumstance and solutions to new problems, faced by a group, are
brought about, it is obvious that, according to an individualistic, invisible-hand no-
tion, only the individual actors are the ones who perceive 'problems' and who re-
spond to changing circumstances by choosing those practices which they expect to
serve their interests. It cannot be simply postulated that from a process of variation
and selection, based on individual imitation, rules will emerge that benefit the
group. Rather, one would have to show why and under what conditions the proc-
ess of individual innovation and individual imitation can be expected to generate
socially beneficial rules - just as the theory of spontaneous social order does not
simply postulate that all spontaneously generated social outcomes are necessarily
beneficial, but explains why this can be expected, given certain 'appropriate' condi-
tions."
Variations in group behaviour cannot only be brought about by a spontaneous interplay
of separate individual actions - this is the process that is favored by Hayek - but also by
planning. Two modes of planning can be distinguished: (1) the group members agree to
accept certain rules - this could be labeled as "planned self-organization" - or (2) new
rules are imposed on the group by one or several persons who are outside the group -
which could be termed "planned external organization".
It is impossible to imagine the emergence of complete formal organizations of a consid-
erable size out of a spontaneous interplay of individual actions. Complex organizational
designs for companies such as ABB, General Motors, or Daimler Benz do not emerge
out of such a process. There are simply too many individuals whose actions have to form
a pattern from spontaneous interaction. What works for tribes does not necessarily work15
for large formal organizations. It is also hard to imagine that spontaneous individual ac-
tions give rise to accounting systems or information systems (Kieser, 1994).
This criticism does not apply to McKelvey and Aldrich's concept since they do not ex-
clude planning as a source of variation of comps. They only assume that planning is es-
sentially "blind", i.e. that it is impossible for planners to construct solutions which fit the
environment. The planners plan and the environment selects.
McKelvey and Aldrich do not analyze which factors induce individuals to change rules or
to introduce new ones. Schulz (1993), a student of March, pursued this question by ap-
plying event history analysis in order to analyze changes over time in a university admini-
stration’s rules. He concentrated on the question of whether the knowledge that organ-
izational members have acquired in the application of rules have positive or negative ef-
fects on rule changes. His most central hypothesis states that probability of a rule change
diminishes with rule age because of habitualization effects. This hypothesis rests on the
following argumentation: The use of rules results in an increase of competence with re-
gard to the use of this rule. The development of alternative rules would devalue this
knowledge and, therefore, the motivation of organizational members to change rules
reduces with the age of these rules. Levitt and March (1988) call this dilemma a
"competency trap" - we will come back to this in more detail later. Acceptance of rules
by organizational members is a second variable that contributes to the increasing stability
of rules. Rules become institutionalized over time. New rules are perceived as prelimi-
nary attempts to solve certain problems. This perception invites changes. The longer a
rule exists, the more members get used to it. However, Schulz also presents a contra-
dictory hypothesis: The older a rule gets the higher the probability that environmental
changes necessitate changes of this rule, because the rules no longer fit the changed con-
ditions, i.e. rules, that have not been adapted to environmental changes become obsolete.
Schulz' data show that the probability of rule change decreases with with rule age. How-
ever, the age of a rule version - the time that has elapsed since the last modification of
the rule - has a positive effect on the probability of further modifications. In his explana-
tion of these results, Schulz points out that rules have stable and instable elements. The
instable elements become obsolete after a modification. Other elements of rules remain16
stable because they mean security and an accumulation of competences for the members
of the organization. This results in a negative effect of rule age on the probability of rule
change.
In another project about rule histories and OL (Beck and Kieser 1997) the question of
the age dependence of rule changes and suspensions was enriched by taking environ-
mental and organizational changes into account. By analyzing the development of a
German bank’s personnel rules it was found that the processes of rule change and rule
suspension followed rather different patterns. While it could be shown that with increas-
ing age of rule versions the rate of rule change strongly decreased, which indicated the
above mentioned habitualization process, the rate of rule suspension slightly increased,
which could be due to a process of obsolescence. The first conclusion from this finding
was that because changes of the rules’ content grew less likely with increasing version
age this content became obsolete. The remaining environmental fit of the older rule ver-
sions seemed to be so bad that the appropriate organizational reaction was to abolish
rather than simply change obsolete rules. However, since the influence of version age on
the suspension rate was not very strong, the process of obsolescence was not a dominant
one. Moreover, while the habitualization effect on rule change remained stable when
additional variables were controlled for, the version age effect lost its significance and
almost disappeared when certain shifts within and outside the organization, such as in-
creases in the number of employees or the occurrence of strikes were included into the
model of rule suspension. A possible explanation for this finding is that the majority of
rule versions which existed up to the periods of organizational and environmental
changes had already become a bit old and were in danger of becoming obsolete but also
younger rule versions lost their fit because of the changes. Since the increase of the num-
ber of employees and the occurrence of strikes had a strong positive influence on the
suspension rate but no influence on the change rate, it can be stated that it was mainly
changes within the environment of a rule - including the intra organizational structure -
which directed the attention of the organization towards the abolishment of rules that
were no longer appropriate. These results showed that it is important to separate the
organizational activities of changing and suspending a rule because they may represent
distinct reactions to different processes.17
4. Learning on OL with the March School
Rules play a major role in the March school’s concepts of OL. In the first of a row of
highly influentual models of OL, Cyert and March (1963) assume that search for better
problem solutions is stimulated as soon as existing programmes do no longer guarantee
the achievement of the organization’s goals that are formulated as aspiration levels.
Search is also controlled by programmes or rules. At first, organizational search pro-
ceeds on the basis of a simple model of causality. The model becomes more complex, if
this initial search is not successful. Problem solutions that are identified during this search
and appear adequate are stored in new programmes that replace the old programmes.
However, organizations not only learn by exchanging programmes in the described pat-
tern, they also learn by adapting goals and attention rules. Two forms of adaptation of
attention rules are conceptualized: Over time, organizations learn to define more appro-
priate performance criteria, and they also learn to identify those parts of the environment
that are important for them. The basic assumption in this concept of organizational
learning is that a rule, be it a decision rule, an attention rule, or a rule that controls goal
formulation, that leads to a preferred state at one point is more likely to be used in the
future than it was in the past, and a rule that leads to a non preferred state at some point
is less likely to be used in the future than it was in the past.
A fundamental problem of this model is that it defines whole organizations or organiza-
tional subunits as the units of analysis which means that the link between individual and
organizational learning is neglected. In a later model, March and Olsen (1975) overcome
this problem by explicitly including the roles of individuals in processes of organizational
learning. They conceptualize a complete learning cycle and identify barriers which can
interrupt learning at different points in this cycle. The complete cycle consists of four
stages (Fig. 1): (1) Individual actions are based on certain individual beliefs. (2) These
actions lead to organizational actions that produce certain outcomes. (3) These outcomes
are interpreted, i.e. success is distinguished from failure and links are drawn between
actions and perceived outcomes. (4) This reasoning leads to beliefs.
The creation or modification of rules that lead to actions are results of experimentation.
In this respect, OL consists of three steps: variation through experimentation, selection18
by drawing inferences from experiments and retention through formulating rules that
produce successful actions and thus can be passed on to other organizational members.
March and Olsen (1975: 155) point out that this complete learning cycle can be inter-
rupted in several ways because:
"[i]ntention does not control behavior precisely. Participation is not a stable conse-
quence of properties of the choice situation or individual preferences. Outcomes
are not a direct consequence of process. Environmental response is not always at-


















Figure 1: The Cycle of Organizational Learning and Its Interruptions (Source: March and
Olsen, 1975)
The first interruption occurs when individuals are prevented by certain organizational
conditions - especially by prevailing role definitions or standard operating procedures -
from adapting their behaviour to their beliefs. March and Olsen call this impediment role
constrained learning. Organizational members are convinced that new actions have to be
initialized because environmental conditions have changed, but they are not able to
change their actions. Their roles within the organization are so fixed by the organiza-
tional structure that there is no possibility for them to act in the way they think they19
should. The second interruption of the learning cycle is labelled audience learning. It
occurs when individuals are able to change their own behaviour but cannot affect rule-
guided actions of others. A third interruption of the learning cycle is caused by a misin-
terpretation of the consequences of organizational actions. The organizational members
cannot evaluate correctly which impact the organizational actions that have been taken
have on the environment and on the results. They tend to interpret data so that the ac-
tions taken in response to certain problems that were identified are supported, i.e., super-
stitious learning takes place. The last interruption is called learning under ambiguity and
occurs when changes in the environment cannot be correctly identified. The organiza-
tional members are not able to make sense of the environment or to explain why certain
changes took place at all.
A few examples can serve to illustrate the interruptions of OL. Let us assume that one
day a controller of a company’s profit center comes to the conclusion that the existing
transfer price system is severely flawed. She asks herself whether she can at least modify
the respective rules for the profit center she is working in. On the one hand, this would
mean that she can provide better data for the manager of this profit center, on the other
hand, she runs the risk of her "correction" being detected and disapproved by the con-
trollers in the headquarters. If she decides not to implement what she thinks is a neces-
sary correction of the rules of the transfer price system she gives in to role constraint
learning.
Now let us assume that she implements new transfer prices in her profit center and that
she tries to convince the central controlling department to change the system of transfer
pricing for the whole company. In doing this, she has to realize that an organizational
member who points out weak spots does not make herself popular in the organization,
especially when those criticized belong to other departments or to higher hierarchical
levels. She cannot be sure that she will be able to convince others with her arguments. If
she fails this will eventually negatively influence her career. It is therefore possible that
our controller decides to keep what she has learned to herself. This would then be an
example of audience learning. As we have seen in our analysis of the dysfunctions of
organizational rules it is often difficult to change existing standard operating procedures.20
Let us now assume that our controller was successful in convincing the people in the
central controlling department to change the transfer price system for the whole com-
pany. Now everybody is eager to find out whether this was a good idea or not. However,
it is extremely difficult to establish the effects of changes in the transfer price system on
the performance of the company. Have results improved because of the changes in the
transfer price system? The proponents of the change are generally in favor of an opti-
mistic interpretation, while the opponents try to get agreement on a negative interpreta-
tion of the new transfer price system’s influence on the performance of the company.
There is always the danger that the interpretations are biased, i.e. that they reflect super-
stitious learning.
If the organizational members are uncertain how to interpret environmental changes at
all, apart from the question how they were influenced by the action of the organization,
they face the situation of learning under ambiguity.
Kim (1993) extended this model. In particular, he reconceptualized the starting point of
the March-Olsen learning cycle: the connection between the "states of the world" and the
ways in which individuals interpret them. Individuals, according to Kim, interpret the
world on the basis of "mental models" (other authors speak of subjective theories). A
mental model represents a person's view of the world, including his or her explicit and
implicit understandings. It provides the context in which the person views and interprets
new information. "Mental models not only help us make sense of the world we see, they
can also restrict our understanding to that which makes sense within the mental model"
(Kim, 1993: 39).
Kim distinguishes two levels of learning - operational and conceptual. Operational learn-
ing concerns learning at the procedural level, e.g. learning the steps which are necessary
to complete a task. This know-how is stored in routines. Thus operational learning leads
to changes in routines. Conceptual learning concerns the thinking about "why things are
done in the first place, sometimes challenging the very nature or existence of prevailing
conditions, procedures, or conceptions and leading to new frameworks in the mental
model" (Kim, 1993: 40). Mental frameworks provide the context in which events are
analyzed and interpreted. A change of frameworks takes place when the individual rou-21
tines that are shaped by the frameworks no longer appear suitable to solve a specific
problem. In this way, a complete individual learning cycle is generated. Certain routines
of actions are implemented and tested because of individual beliefs (frameworks) that
these actions have positive effects for the organization. Unsatisfactory results, however,
eventually lead to a revision of the mental frameworks that are responsible for the im-
plementation of the routines.
According to Kim, mental models not only exist at the individual but, as "shared mental
models", also at the organizational level. These represent, on the one hand, the organiza-
tion´s consensual view of the world - what Kim calls the organization´s
”weltanschauung”. Organizational shared mental models also contain the organizational
routines which are former individual routines that have proven successful in the organi-
zation and have been adopted by others. As a result, the full organizational learning cycle
encompasses changes in the shared mental models which, in turn, presuppose changes in
the individual beliefs and routines.
This reasoning leads Kim to add three additional interruptions to the March-Olsen
model: The first is situational learning. It occurs when an individual solves a new prob-
lem by improvised action but does not store the solution in his individual mental model
for later use. The learning is only coupled to one solitary event. Another friction of the
learning cycle is called fragmented learning. This type of interruption occurs when indi-
vidual learning takes place but does not succeed in changing the shared mental models.
The organizational view of the world remains the same. The difference between this form
of interrupted learning and "audience learning" in the March-Olsen model is not easy to
establish. It might be argued that March and Olsen (1975) concentrate on the missing
link between individual and organizational action while Kim (1993) also takes the link
between individual and organizational world views into consideration. The third addition
to interruptions of the learning cycle is called opportunistic learning. It occurs when
organizational members want to take advantage of a rather unique and promising chance
but the standard operating procedures or the shared mental models are not yet adapted
to the new situation. So the organizational actors have to circumvent the existing rules in
order to prevent the chance from disappearing.22
The question that such an analysis suggests is: How do individuals arrange their way of
learning in these ambiguous situations and by which factors are they influenced in their
attempts to draw inferences from what they perceive? March and Olsen (1975) argue
that the behaviour of an organizational member is influenced by different patterns of
interaction with other organizational members, varying levels of trust and different de-
grees of integration into the organization. Dependent on these variables, individuals
differ with regard to their patterns of perception of organizational events. The more inte-
grated into the organization an individual is, the greater his or her tendency is to perceive
mainly those events which confirm his or her state of integration. That means, it is more
likely that what one sees is what one likes and that what one likes is what one sees. An
alienated person, in contrast, will mainly perceive things that he or she does not like and
will dislike what he or she sees, because this individual will tend to find as much evidence
as possible for the differences between him- or herself and other organizational members.
Similar to this pattern of influences on attention is the way in which trust among organ-
izational members affects individuals in their way of perceiving organizational events.
The more an organizational member trusts his or her colleagues the more likely it is that
he or she will like what they like. The more he or she distrusts his or her colleagues the
more likely it is that he or she will dislike what they like. In a more trustful atmosphere
an individual will be more likely to perceive what other organizational members perceive.
The more he or she distrusts his or her colleagues the more likely it is that he or she will
not see what the other participants see.
Individual learning which can contribute to the whole organization is therefore strongly
affected by integration and trust. The available sources of information that are provided
through interactions and discussions are assessed in different ways dependent on integra-
tion and trust. The organizational code - the organizational mental model - is not
adopted or is adopted only slowly. However, this does not necesserily mean that the or-
ganization cannot benefit from deviating members.
In a simulation study, March (1991) found that organizational actors that are slow learn-
ers - persons that socialize more slowly into the organizational code - contribute a lot to
the benefit of the organization. The slow learner does not take the prevailing beliefs of23
the other participants for granted, but explores the outside world for new possibilities of
acting instead of just exploiting the experiences already made. Thus a greater amount of
knowledge about the ”real” states of the world can be achieved and accepted by the or-
ganization, which means that the organizational code adapts to the additional knowledge
of the deviating organizational member. "Slow learning on the part of individuals main-
tains diversity longer, thereby providing the exploration that allows the knowledge found
in the organizational code to improve." (1991: 76)
However, an organization cannot only benefit from the slowing down of individual
learning but also from slowing down the whole rate of organizational adaptation to envi-
ronmental shifts (Lounamaa and March, 1987; see also Levinthal and March, 1981). Or-
ganizations that change too quickly to adapt to new situations might be unsuccessful
because they have not gathered enough experience to judge the new situation reliably. In
turbulent environments frequent and continuous adjustments can lead to learning false
lessons through adaptation to misleading signals. In order to avoid this type of ”false”
adaptation, it is more intelligent for the organization to wait until there is a greater sam-
ple of environmental signals from which to draw inferences about the ”real” events in the
environment. Furthermore, a high rate of adaptation often means that there is simultane-
ous learning at different parts of the organization. This also can have a negative effect on
the adaptability of organizations because the different adaptations might not be comple-
mentary.
Moreover, personnel turnover can contribute to OL (March, 1991). This is the case
when mid-level turnover accompanies fast socialization into the organizational code.
What has to be learned by the organization is quickly adopted by the individuals. How-
ever, because there are always a number of newcomers in the organization, the tendency
of exploring yet unknown possibilities, and implementing this new knowledge into the
organization, does not vanish. On the other hand, if turnover is too high the individual
learning of the organizational code, as well as the implementation of new insights by de-
viating individuals, is distorted. As a result, the organizational knowledge code cannot be
improved. Therefore, modest turnover in connection with fast socializing leads to the
highest organizational benefits compared to other combinations of personnel turnover
and socialization speeds.24
In their attempt to learn from experience, organizations not only take into account their
own experience - new or old certainties - they also survey the experiences of other com-
parable organizations. Hence, another major item of the behavioral theory of OL is the
observation of learning in ecologies of other learning organizations. Levitt and March
(1988) looked at processes of information diffusion among organizations, a phenomenon
which is also of interest for the neo-institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).
The first process, which can be called coercive, is the recommendation of a new rule by a
single agent, e.g. by a professional association or a union. Different organizations are
affected by this recommendation to different degrees. Another process of knowledge
diffusion, labelled mimetic, can be observed when new organizational routines are trans-
ferred through communication between organizations which have already implemented
this routine and those which have not. The third process, called normative, is the teach-
ing of new routines by a small group of influential persons or institutions, like manage-
ment experts or educational institutions.
In accordance with proponents of the neo-institutional theory (Meyer and Rowan, 1977),
Levitt and March (1988) argue that organizations not only copy routines from other or-
ganizations in order to achieve technical efficiency, but also come under pressure to
adopt practices that are commonly regarded as useful, so as not to loose their legitimacy.
As a result, two different consequences for organizations from which practices are cop-
ied can be observed. Organizations, whose experiences concerning technological effi-
ciency are transferred to other organizations, mainly suffer from this diffusion because
their competitive advantage disappears. Organizations, whose routines are copied to gain
legitimacy, basicallly benefit from the diffusion because the more other organizations
follow these routines the more their own legitimacy increases.
OL is an interactive process. Competitors learn similar technologies at the same time,
and the learning of one organization depends on the learning of other organizations, be-
cause knowledge often diffuses among competitive learners. This has a severe impact on
the outcomes of organizational actions which are learned. The returns of learning new
strategies or technologies, i.e. the competitive advantage of the implementation of new
organizational routines, are not only dependent on the quality of these technologies and25
the quality of learning, but also on the competences and efforts of the competitors in
dealing with the new technologies (Levitt and March, 1988: 322; Herriott, Levinthal, and
March, 1985).
The interactive process of learning in ecologies of competing organizations has another
effect that contributes to the overall development of technology. Innovations are neces-
sary for technological progress and for meeting the needs for change of systems of or-
ganizations. However, the introduction of new technological elements is risky, for it is
not possible to foresee whether these innovations will have positive results. Nevertheless,
it is necessary, according to the ideology of good management, to bring new ideas into
the shared world of organizational perception. This leads to situations which March
(1981) calls "unwitting altruism", because one organization is running experiments with
uncertain outcomes and other organzations have the chance to observe whether these
innovations are successful before they decide to copy them. However, drawing conclu-
sions from observations is also subject to superstitious learning and to ambiguity, espe-
cially, since rhetoric is applied in reports of these experiments (Kieser, 1997).
Levitt and March (1988) are pointing to another consequence of the competitive situa-
tion of learning organizations in ecologies of other learning organizations. The ability to
adapt to experience accumulated in changing enivironments must itself be learned. Pow-
erful organizations that are able to create their own environment, normally are not in a
position in which they have to learn how to learn. As a result, their competence to adapt
when environmental shifts take place that have not been created by these organizations
are more limited than those of weaker organizations, which are used to having to adapt
to changing situations.
The different approaches to OL that we have discussed so far are all based on one as-
sumption: Organizations learn from their experience. However, sometimes organizations
face the problem that there are only very few or no cases from which they can draw in-
ferences, but the necessity to learn is nevertheless existent (March, Sproull, and Tamuz,
1991). A very striking example of such a situation is provided by an airline that wants to
reduce the probability of future accidents. Since no airline has experienced a large sample
of fatal accidents the experiental base for learning is very poor. Organizations have de-
veloped different strategies to enlarge their bases of experience. The first is to take more26
aspects of experience into account, e.g. to register not only the outcomes of a decision
but also the experiences while making that decision: Organizational decisions on a certain
issue depend on the outcomes of former decisions on this issue. However, it often takes
too much time to wait for the outcomes of former decisions or the outcomes turn out to
be ambiguous. In these cases, organizational members tend to make a decision that re-
sembles the former one if they have experienced positive accompanying consequences
when making this decision – e.g. a friendly atmosphere (March, Sproull, and Tamuz,
1991: 2).
Another possibility is to attend to the different interpretations of the outcome of one or-
ganizational action. The conflicting opinions about what has happened in the past lead to
a variety of different lessons that can be learned. Also, preferences are not fixed.
Through the process of learning and interpreting the past, organizations modify their
opinions of what a success is, and what a failure. This also enlarges the comprehension
of history. When there are no events at all to learn from, organizations have to draw in-
ferences from events that almost happened, or they have to create hypothetical histories.
Both are techniques to simulate experience. "Near histories" of events that - sometimes
luckily - did not take place are very often regarded as if they had taken place, because the
differences between the condition of occurrence and the conditions of non-occurrence
are very small. If an air traffic accident had just been avoided - only thanks to a lucky
circumstance - airlines can learn about the conditions of an accident by pretending that
this lucky circumstance had not existed.
Hypothetical histories are quite similar to near histories. However, they not only repre-
sent one possible alternative plot of events, but a whole distribution of histories that
might have happened if circumstances had changed only a little bit. The construction of
hypothetical histories is based on theories which are developed on the basis of the actu-
ally experienced sample of events. Thus, an actual incident leads to reflection on the
background variables of this incident. These background variables then are used to con-
struct a bigger sample of histories from which the actual plot was only one possible
manifestation. This means that organizations enlarge the number of lessons of experience
by creating histories that are not actually observable and might never even have taken
place.27
Apart from the problem of the costs of constructing hypothetical histories and the fact
that simulated events are never as compelling as real ones, the difficulty of simulated
histories is that their interpretation is often very ambiguous. Judging that an accident is
very likely to happen if a special source of failure is not suspended tends to be regarded
as too pessimistic in the presence of success. On the other hand, optimistic interpreta-
tions of what could have happened, if the outcome had just barely missed the goal, tend
to be regarded as too optimistic and unrealistic. Generally, it is is possible to argue that
"[i]t is not clear whether the learning should emphasize how close the organization came
to a disaster, thus the reality of danger in the guise of safety, or the fact that disaster was
avoided, thus the reality of safety in the guise of danger" (March, Sproull, and Tamuz,
1991: 10).
Summarizing the development of concepts within the group around March, we can state
that at the beginning there was an approach that took organizations as units of analysis
which adapted to experience in reaction to environmental changes. The question of how
this adaptation is brought about, was neglected at first. Then, the theory was extended by
analyzing interactional processes. Organizations can benefit from individual insights,
however they can also make it impossible to transfer individual knowledge to the organ-
izational level. It can be considered an important result that this school has pointed out
that deviant behavior of members can substantially contribute to organizational welfare,
because through divergent interpretations of reality the chances of exploring new possi-
bilities of action are increased. After having taken a closer look at the micro-mechanisms
of interaction, the macro-levels of organizational interaction, the learning of organiza-
tions within ecologies of other learning organizations became a focus of analysis.
"Unwitting altruism" and different effects of being copied were some results that this
analysis produced. How to realize learning in the absence of experience was another im-
portant issue which this school took up. Creating hypothetical histories is a strategy of
organizations to cope with this dilemma.28
5. Limits of Rule-based Learning
As there are well-known limits of rationality, there are also limits of rule-based learning
(Levinthal and March, 1993). A closer examination of the relationship between organ-
izational success (or failure) and OL suggests that learning is not at all easy to imple-
ment. It is only in certain circumstances that it appears as a route to intelligence and suc-
cess.
Already the early literature of the school around March showed how the same mecha-
nisms of OL and rule-following that lead to improvements could also destroy them
(March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963). Especially the effectiveness of OL in
the short-run, and in the near neighbourhood of current experience, has been shown to
interfere with learning in the long run (Levinthal and March, 1993).
5.1. How Success Breeds Failure
The most commonly cited example of limited learning is the process leading to the so
called "competency trap".
The process starts from the propensity of successful organizations to accumulate slack in
the form of surplus resources. These resources become a buffer against the dangers of
unpredictable outside shocks, but may also become a source of organizational inefficien-
cies.
When management experiences that certain activities appear successful they tend to
perform them more frequently, standardize them, and specialize in them. The "success
recipe" becomes programmed. Programmes generate activities that resemble those that
have led to good results in the past.
However, organizational slack allows management to reduce dependence and that makes
the organization less sensitive to outside events in the long run. Management becomes
blind vis à vis environmental changes, and if it does perceive them, becomes unable to
respond to them beyond the recipes which their programmes provide.29
The organizational autonomy, together with overconfidence on their programmed
"successful recipe", leads management to accumulate experience mainly in connection
with their routines that provide success and to stick to the existing operation rules. Being
competent in an activity leads to success, which leads to greater competence. The or-
ganizational members become more skilled with a technology and with the programmes
which surround it. Efficiency in using one alternative makes trying other alternatives un-
likely. The organizational members are locked in into their competencies. Success fosters
programming, and programming facilitates success, but mainly in a short run (Starbuck,
Greve, and Hedberg, 1978).
"A competency trap occurs when favorable performance with an inferior procedure
leads to an organization to accumulate more experience with, thus keeping experi-
ence with a superior procedure inadequate to make it rewarding to use." (Levitt
and March, 1988: 322)
Organizations pursue routines and procedures, which in the past have produced success,
too often and too long. It is difficult to escape the competency trap since the exploration
of alternatives is getting less certain, more time consuming and more distant from the
present actions than returns from exploitations of the present technologies are. When the
conditions change, organizations find themselves in trouble and suffer from obsoles-
cence. The competency trap is a potentially self-destructive product of organizational
learning.
However, it is not inevitable. The danger of the trap can be reduced by rewarding ex-
periments, by changing the adjustment of aspirations to performance, and by changing
ideologies (Levinthal and March, 1993).
An important measure which can guard against falling into the competency trap is the
encouragement of exploratory activities and a systematic evaluation of the results. In
order to achieve these goals, it is necessary to motivate organizational members to ex-
periment. Experimentation has to become attractive for them. This means: Large rewards
have to be provided for successful explorations and negative consequences of explora-
tory mistakes have to be avoided for the organizational members.
The degree of exploration also depends on the relation between performance and aspira-
tions. Exploration is more likely to be undertaken when the absolute difference between30
performance and aspiration grows (unless survival is threatened) (March and Shapira,
1992). Also, for equal absolute differences, a greater tendency towards exploration can
be expected with failure than with success. Normally, aspirations are optimistic moving
averages of past performance. That means that in most cases aspirations are not far
above or below performance. This constellation only leads to modest experimentation of
the refinement type or to little experimentation. If aspirations were stable or only
changed slowly, performance would deviate - positively or negatively - substantially from
aspirations and these deviations would induce more substantial exploration.
Therefore, in order to encourage experimentation, a policy of slowing down the adapta-
tion of organizational aspirations is advantageous. The same effect is achieved by linking
organizational aspiration levels to performance of other organizations that do much bet-
ter or much poorer.
Creating ideologies (visions) can also help to reduce the natures of the competency trap.
New ideologies systematically change the mental models and thereby encourage experi-
mentation. Success is thus not "deterministically" bringing about inferior rules or organ-
izational failures. In the behavioural literature some observations indicate that success
which leads to slack resources, enables management to become less vulnerable of its en-
vironment, relax its controls and existing rules, increase experimentation, reduce the
fears of failure, and improve performance. Occasionally, success increases self-
confidence of managers, and, thereby risk-taking (March and Shapira, 1987). Slack gen-
erates manouevering space, and it creates an “experimenting atmosphere” which may
result in unintended innovations (March, 1981; Levitt and March, 1988: 334). However,
in the majority of cases, success seems to be the enemy of experimentation.
5.2. How Failure Breeds Failure
Organizations in a crisis tend to avoid those rules and procedures that have led to fail-
ures. Several studies have indicated that organizational crises tend to lead to a tightening
of controls, a centralization of authority and a low level of risk taking (Staw, Sandelands,
and Dutton, 1981; Czarniawska-Joerges and Hedberg, 1985) As a result, the organiza-31
tional rigidity as well as competition within the organization tend to increase. Under
these conditions it is likely that resistance against stricter controls will rise, and the
internal conflicts will increase in the organization (Tainio, Korhonen, and Santalainen,
1991). This will spread fear and defensiveness around the organization which will dete-
riorate the organizational crisis, lead to managerial paralysis, and propel the organization
further towards failure. Thus, the failure often becomes accentuated and results in an
endless cycle of failure and unrewarding change.
This "failure trap" can also emerge from another process (Levinthal and March, 1993).
Attempts to avoid existing procedures often trigger search for change. However, these
failure-driven search efforts are often found to be relatively narrow, focused mainly on
the improvement of productive efficiency with known technologies and procedures
(Cyert and March, 1963). A genuine renewal of routines is a rare event. The organiza-
tions, in which this occurs, often suffer from the difficulties of gaining the returns of
continuous experimentation and innovations. An organization that is heavily engaged in
experimentation often has difficulties to exploit the results of this experimentation since
not enough time or energy is left.
Failure leads to search and change which leads to failure which leads to more search and
so on. This pathology of failing new rules and procedures are due to the following perva-
sive features of organizational life (Levinthal and March, 1993):
(1) Most new ideas are bad ones and most innovations are unrewarding.
(2) Even succesful innovations, when first introduced, are likely to perform poorly until
experience has accumulated in using them.
(3) Aspirations are adjusted downward more slowly than they are adjusted upward and
they exhibit a consistent optimistic bias.
However, this "failure trap" can also be broken (Levinthal and March, 1993). Failure
may lead to search and change, by which an exceptionally good new alternative can be
found and introduced. Although these failure-driven search efforts are often found to be
relatively narrow, focused mainly to improve productive efficiency with known tech-
nologies and procedures (Cyert and March, 1963), they still may be critical in stopping
the deterioration process and in creating a turnaround.32
In general, success seems to decrease search and increase rule-following, and failure
tends to increase search and the questioning of old rules and procedures. Reverse ten-
dencies are possible, but require special efforts. The same mechanism of learning that
leads to improvements also leads to limits of those improvements.
6. Concluding remarks
Behavioral theories of  the firm, as represented by James G. March and his collaborators
during the last four decades, portray organizations as target-oriented and rule-based
systems that adapt incrementally to past experience. This view is sharply distinct from the
conventional doctrine of  rational choice, which assumes that organizational action is
based on preferences, expectations about future outcomes, and choices made based on
these expectations (March, 1988: 2-3).
In the tradition of the behavioural approach OL is viewed as a continuous process
involving experimentation, monitoring of results, and modifying future behaviour on the
basis of those results. Routines and rules are developed as experience about different
contingencies accumulates. These routines become a foundation for future rule-driven
behaviour and learning. This view of history-dependent learning processes has provided a
serious empirical as well as theoretical challenge to the notion of an anticipatory choice
as a basis for organizational intelligence.
Behavioural theories of organizational learning challenge also a traditional psychological
view of learning, where the sign of learning is defined as a change in response or
performance when the stimulus-situation and the motivation of an individual are
essentially the same (Weick, 1991).
Behavioural theories of OL observe that stimulus-situations in organizations are mostly
unstable and subject to change. Second, the centrality of routines in organizational life
tends to make responses of organizations relatively constant and similar. The routines
themselves encode and perpetuate what has been learned in the past, but individual
routines are slow to change. When they do change, this typically occurs through the
addition of new subroutines. This suggests that the portfolio of routines is an important
site of organizational learning (Weick, 1991).33
Organizational learning is a process rather than an outcome. The process view of
learning portrays both organizations and their environments in a constant flux from
which a variety of stimuli can be identified at different levels (Cohen, March, and Olsen,
1972).
Under these conditions organizational learning is essentially based on limited rationality.
Individual agents have limited ability to process information in uncertain and
continuously changing environments. The search for satisfying solutions tends to
emphasize either refinements of existing knowledge or exploration of new knowledge.
This depends, to a large extent, on how organizational performance is related to achieved
targets.
Behavioral perspective highlights that organizational learning does not need to be
conscious and intentional, but there are numerous and varied subprocesses that
contribute to changing of an organization's intelligence. Organizational learning may
often result in new and significant insights and awareness of different alternatives that
dictate no behavioral change. This new self-reflection may not result in observable
changes in short-term behaviour (Huber, 1991).
Summing up, the behavioral theories redescribe the phenomenon of OL by specifying
processes by which the range of organizations' potential behaviors are changed (Huber,
1991). They clarify some of the fundamental issues in understanding human behavior in
modern organizations.
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